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Abstract
The scientific study into the functional properties of memory has recently undergone a rapid
increase.  These studies reveal that processing stimuli for its survival value results in superior
memory performance in children and adults.  In the current article, we critically evaluate this
claim and conclude that survival-processing advantages in childhood and adulthood are not an
indication that fitness-relevant information has adaptive priority.  Instead, we argue that general
memory principles (e.g., item-specific and relational processing, self-reference, elaboration and
distinctiveness) are more probative explanations of the functional engineering of memory.  We
stress the importance of these memory processes because these are the processes that comprise
our memory adaptation, are present early in life, and are developmentally invariant.
Keywords: Adaptive memory, Survival processing, elaboration, distinctiveness, item-specific
processing, relational processing
Proximate Mechanisms and the Development of Adaptive Memory
            Information processed for its importance to survival is remembered better than that same
information processed in other contexts (Nairne, 2010; Otgaar, Smeets, & van Bergen, 2010).  Not
only does survival processing accrue mnemonic benefits, but survival information itself enjoys
similar advantages (Howe & Derbish, 2010; see Table 1).  These benefits are thought to arise
because human (and perhaps some nonhuman animal) memory systems have evolved to prioritize
survival-related information over other information due to its greater adaptive significance.
            Although survival-related effects are well documented in adults, questions remain about
the importance of the discovery that survival-processing effects appear early in ontogeny (Aslan
& Bauml, 2012; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Garner, 2012; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; see Table 2).
This question is important to theories of adaptive memory1 because many of the adaptive
behaviors we see in adults, ones that have arisen through ancestral selection pressures, can and
should be found in children (Bjorklund & Pelligrini, 2000; Volk & Atkinson, 2008).  Indeed, for
some, a particularly critical test of the adaptive nature of a specific behavior can be found in
whether it is present in younger members of the species2.
            However appealing this idea may seem, we argue that the answer to ontological questions
concerning the beginnings of fitness-relevant mnemonic advantages are not important to theories
of adaptive memory per se.  To be specific, we are only referring to the fitness-relevant functions
of memory although similar arguments might apply to non-fitness-relevant aspects of children’s
memory that may also be adaptive (e.g., context dependent memory, infantile and childhood
amnesia, suggestibility).  Although questions concerning age-related changes in adaptive memory
are important in the context of understanding memory development more generally, they are
perhaps of limited value when determining the origins of adaptive memory.  Indeed, that our
memory system has been shaped by evolutionary pressure is not in question.  Neither should there
be a question about the adaptive functions associated with memory from very early in life (Howe,
2011).  Thus, the questions answered by developmental investigations of adaptive memory are
important to a complete theory of memory development but they do not settle issues concerning
the priority of fitness-relevant information early in ontogeny.
Developmental Assumptions
            Consider the assumption that biases that have evolved to retain survival-related
information should already be present early in life.  Although this may be true, it is equally
plausible that adaptive behaviors do not emerge until later in development.  Indeed, particular
developmental events may have to occur prior to the appearance of an adaptive behavior (i.e., the
expression of an adaptation may be experience expectant or experience dependent; Howe, 2011).
Specifically, the expression of a fitness-relevant memory system may not occur until there has
been sufficient experience with and knowledge of survival-relevant situations.  Because
developmental events may differ across individuals within as well as across cultures, fitness-
relevant memory may not emerge at the same time in all children.  Although we may all
eventually exhibit an advantage for storing and retrieving fitness-relevant information, the
ontogenetic course of the emergence of this adaptive memory effect may vary considerably.
            Of course, to qualify as an adaptation, a characteristic must emerge at some point during
an organism’s life.  However, this does not mean that adaptations need to be present early in life,
as many emerge long after birth (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; Confer
et al., 2010).  Examples include bipedal locomotion (approximately one year after birth), language
(during the second year of life), and secondary sex characteristics (during puberty).  Indeed, it is
frequently not until this latter development occurs that thoughts about sex emerge, something that
is clearly relevant to adaptation, particularly reproductive behavior.  Simply because thoughts
about sex and the biological mechanisms necessary for reproduction do not emerge until puberty
would not lead one to argue that these behaviors and thoughts are not adaptive.
            To return to the memory issues at hand, what these examples illustrate is that the
emergence of a behavior or characteristic, if it is adaptive, is guaranteed during the life of an
organism.  However, the timing of its emergence is not a defining feature of whether a particular
behavior or characteristic is or is not adaptive.  In terms of adaptive memory, and, more
specifically survival processing, it is reasonable to assume that thoughts about, experiences with,
or knowledge of survival only emerge later in life when adult hunter-gatherer ancestors would
actually have needed to act on these survival-related cognitions.  These cognitions might emerge
even later in some of today’s (Western) cultures given the rather extended periods of infancy and
childhood that many people experience these days.  From this perspective, the timing of the
emergence of survival-processing effects in memory does not necessarily provide critical
information about the adaptive nature or evolutionary origins of this form of mnemonic benefit3.
Proximate Mechanisms and Developmental Invariance in Adaptive Memory
            If these developmental survival-processing effects are not the result of the early emergence
of fitness-relevant memory system, then what are they indicative of?  Although we agree that our
memory system is the result of evolutionary pressures, we argue that survival-processing effects
can be explained within the context of an adaptive memory system whose proximate mechanisms
are reasonably well documented (see Table 3).  When examined in the context of proximate
mechanisms, many of the important features turn out to be developmentally invariant.  For
example, distinctiveness effects (e.g., features that discriminate among stimuli) play an important
role in memory from infancy (Rovee-Collier & Cuevas, 2009) onward (Howe, 2011, 2006a).
Item (e.g., stimulus-specific features), relational (e.g., common features among stimuli), and self-
referential processing (e.g., processing information relevant for the self; Ross et al., 2011) also
appears to have an early emergence (Rovee-Collier & Cuevas, 2009; Symons & Johnson, 1997) in
memory and have developmentally invariant characteristics across childhood (Howe, 2011,
2006a).  Importantly, distinctiveness, item- and relational-processing, and self-referential
processing are factors that underlie the survival-processing advantage and that contribute to the
elaborate structure of traces that are best preserved in memory.  Perhaps these are the adaptive
tools of memory that were carved out throughout evolution that account for adaptive memory
effects and not the storage of fitness-relevant information per se.  Although much of survival- or
fitness-relevant information is distinctive and well elaborated in memory, the mnemonic
advantage of such information may simply be a byproduct of these more general memory
principles.  In what follows, we suggest that it is these types of processing, individually or
combined, that can contribute to adaptive memory effects more generally, as well as those
observed in children.
To explain, survival-processing tasks require participants to engage in both item-specific
(e.g., encoding information about a specific predator such as it has large eyes and attacks at night)
and relational (e.g., encoding information about how it is like other predators such it attacks from
the sky and has large talons) processing.  In contrast, the usual control processing tasks only
require participants to engage in either one or the other type of processing but not both.  Although
each type of processing enhances retention, their combination has especially powerful effects on
retention.  Whereas relational processing enhances retention by providing an integrated structure
to organize items within the memory trace, item-specific processing enhances the discriminability
(distinctiveness) of items within the trace (Burns, 2006).  These effects in tandem enhance the
storage and retrieval of information, resulting in better memory performance in adults (Burns,
2006) and children (Howe 2006b).  Indeed, survival tasks induce high levels of self-referential
processing and this processing enhances memory performance.
The role of self-reference in the survival-processing effect has been addressed in previous
research (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010; Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & van Arsdall, 2009; Nairne,
Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008).  Some of this research showed that the survival processing
advantage remained when directly compared to a self-reference condition.  However, these tasks
simply required participants to rate how easily a word brought to mind an important personal
experience, an instruction that often fails to find a self-reference effect (Klein, in press; Klein,
Loftus, & Burton, 1989).  When participants are first asked to retrieve an episodic memory and
then rate how easily the words bring to mind a personal experience, the survival processing effect
is eliminated.  Therefore, self-referential processing is an important contributor to the survival
processing effect.
The idea that item-specific and relational processing might also underlie the survival
processing advantage was examined in a series of experiments (Burns, Hwang, & Burns, 2011).
When control tasks involved only a single processing type (item specific vs. relational), survival
processing produced better memory performance.  However, when the control task involved both
types of processing, the survival memory task did not evince a mnemonic advantage.  What this
finding suggests is that both item-specific and relational processing might underlie the survival
processing advantage.
Elaboration and distinctiveness effects have been found to account for survival processing
effects in other experiments as well.  If greater unusualness of the survival instruction equates to
greater elaborative processing, then more relational processing should occur which should to
superior memory performance.  Indeed, many of the control scenarios (e.g., moving homes, going
on a holiday) used in adaptive memory experiments tend to be more ordinary and familiar to
participants than survival scenarios and there is a growing body of evidence that greater
elaboration might contribute to the survival-processing effect.  For example, when the richness
(elaborateness) of encoding and item distinctiveness are comparable, performance differences
between survival processing and control tasks disappear (Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011;
Kroneisen, Erdfelder, & Buchner, in press).  Similarly, when the degree of elaboration is equated
across rating scenarios (regardless of whether these were high or low levels of elaboration), there
is no performance advantage associated with survival processing (Howe & Derbish, in press).
Specifically, when the survival scenario was compared with control scenarios that were unusual
and ancestrally irrelevant (i.e., traveling to a foreign planet, exploring an underwater city), the
typical memory superiority effect disappeared (Howe & Derbish, in press; Kostic, McFarlan, &
Cleary, 2012).  Indeed, memory performance in the standard survival scenario can be worse when
compared to extremely unusual scenarios (i.e., being attacked by zombies in the city and
grasslands; Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011).  Overall, these studies show that at least part of the
survival memory effect can be attributed to elaborate processing, independent of the ancestral
relevance of the survival scenario.  Indeed, the common feature among the ever increasing
number of studies that have not found such a survival processing advantage is that they have all
provided direct tests of well known, general memory factors that may have arisen because of
evolutionary pressures on retention, ones that are correlated with the mnemonic demands imposed
by requests to engage in survival processing (Seamon et al., 2012).
Together, these studies show that survival processing enhances memory over some other
tasks because it recruits a powerful set of memory processes. These processes (item-specific and
relational processing, self-referential processing, elaboration and distinctiveness) account for a
whole host of memory phenomena including the advantages associated with processing fitness-
relevant information.  Indeed, “it is not the evolutionary significance of survival per se that
explains the survival processing effect.  Rather, the degree to which survival processing invites
elaborative, distinctive forms of encoding would predict the mnemonic benefit of survival
processing” [Kroneisen & Erdfleder, 2011, p. 1554].  Importantly, just because these effects are
developmentally invariant (Howe, 2011, 2006a, 2006b), does not allow one to conclude that
survival-processing advantages in childhood are an indication that fitness-relevant information has
adaptive priority.  Rather, what this shows is that the proximate mechanisms (item-specific and
relational processing, self-referential, elaboration and distinctiveness) sculpted through evolution
that comprise our memory adaptation are present early in life and are indeed, developmentally
invariant.
The synopsis that we have presented so far has mainly centered on the concept of adaptive
memory using the survival-processing paradigm.  Of course, the evolutionary crafting of memory
has also received scientific attention using other processes, paradigms, and perspectives (see
Table 4).  For example, faces that are experienced as untrustworthy are better remembered than
faces perceived as trustworthy (Rule, Slepian, & Ambady, 2012), a finding that is related to the
possibility of an evolved “cheater detection module” (Cosmides, 1989).  Also, myriad studies
show that face recognition is a highly unique ability that offers humans an obvious advantage in
survival (Maguinnes & Newell, in press ; but see Savine, Scullin, & Roediger, 2011).  Research
has also shown that the increased rates of false memories that can occur in survival-processing
tasks and with survival-related materials can have positive and adaptive consequences.  Indeed,
Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, and Knott (2011) showed that memory illusions were able to prime
solutions on complex problem solving tasks in both children as adults.  Overall, our stance is that
adopting an evolutionary view of such findings has significant value, yet will benefit even more
when considering that certain well studied memory principles are likely to underpin these effects.
Conclusion
We have critically evaluated claims that developmental studies of memory for fitness-
relevant information provide a touchstone for evolutionary models of adaptive memory.
Specifically, we have argued that the assumption that there exists a preference to store and process
survival-related information early in life is not necessarily the whole story.  In fact, there are many
developmental outcomes that could be consistent with the assumption that our memory system
has been shaped by evolutionary pressures and that no one outcome is diagnostic of this fact.
Indeed, many adaptations emerge long after birth (e.g., language, secondary sex characteristics)
and it is equally plausible that the mnemonic advantages associated with survival processing
could occur later in life when individuals have had more experience with and knowledge of fitness-
relevant behaviors and situations. We have argued that many of the mnemonic processes (item-
specific and relational processing, self-referential, elaboration and distinctiveness) that have been
found to account for performance in survival-processing tasks also provide a compelling
explanation for the developmentally invariant advantages observed for fitness-relevant
information in children’s memory.
Finally, we have argued that the mnemonic advantage associated with survival processing
may not lie in the adaptive significance of such processing, but in the fact that such processing
recruits other well-known memory processes that enhance retention.  Many of these processes
occur relatively automatically and can be observed in numerous mnemonic situations regardless
of age.  It is undoubtedly true that our memory system is the outcome of evolutionary pressures,
ones that have sculpted today’s adaptive mnemonic processes.  However, that a survival-
processing advantage is a specific component of an adaptive memory system, one that is
developmentally invariant, is not necessarily demanded by an evolutionary hypothesis.  Indeed,
developmental outcomes are agnostic on this issue.  Perhaps a profitable focus of future scientific
study into the functional properties of memory would be to identify the possible proximate
mechanisms that play a role in adaptive memory generally, and survival-processing specifically.
Although we have mentioned some of these variables, the identification of additional mechanisms
operating throughout development will help us understand how our adaptive memory systems
changes from childhood to adulthood.
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Notes
1We use the term adaptive memory to refer to the general collection of tasks used to study fitness-
relevant functions of memory.  That is, this term is used to refer not just to survival-processing
tasks (the primary focus of this article) or survival-relevant information, but also to other
processes [e.g., self-referential processing (see Klein, in press; Ross, Anderson, & Campbell,
2011)] and tasks [e.g., episodic future thinking (see Atance & O’Neill, 2005)].
2
 As an example, the finding that priming rates in memory appear to be relatively constant across
age in childhood has been used as evidence that implicit memory is an evolutionarily earlier, more
primitive memory system than explicit memory (see Reber, 1989).
 
3Some would claim that the emergence of a survival-processing advantage in childhood is
evidence that this is an adaptive memory advantage for fitness-relevant information.  However,
we argue that these findings simply show that the proximate mechanisms, ones that may be more
likely to be engaged in survival-processing tasks or with survival-relevant information, are what
emerge in childhood.  Although these mechanisms may have some implicit fitness relevance (e.g.,
remembering a caregiver’s face or voice may promote survival), the explicit fitness-relevant
benefits may not be present until children have had more experience with, or knowledge about,
survival-relevant situations.
Table 1.  Survival Processing and Survival Information Effects
1. Survival processing effect: Participants are provided with a scenario, such as being stranded in
the grasslands of a foreign land, and given the following instructions:
“We would like you to imagine that you have been stranded in the
grasslands of a foreign land.  You are completely alone and have no
supplies or basic survival materials, so over the next couple of weeks
you will need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect
yourself from predators.  We are going to show you a list of words
and we would like you to rate them for how relevant each word would
be for your survival in this scenario.”
Participants are then presented with a list of concepts (e.g., items from categories such as fruit,
vegetable, four-footed animals) and asked to rate each of them for their relevance to the survival
scenario using a Likert Scale (where 1 = least relevant to 7 = most relevant).
A typical control condition might involve asking participants to rate these same words for
pleasantness given the following instructions:
“We are going to show you a list of words and we would like you to rate
each word for how pleasant you find that word.”
Where the pleasantness scale ranged from 1 (least pleasant) to 7 (most pleasant).
Alternatively, participants may be asked to rate these same items for their relevance to
some other activity such as moving:
"We want you to imagine you are in the process of moving house, but
there is no one around to help you so you must arrange the move by yourself.  
While imagining this scenario, your job will be to rate the following words
on a scale from 1-7 for how relevant the meaning of that word would be for you
successfully moving house on your own."
After participants have rated the words, they receive a surprise recall or recognition test.
Typically, memory for concepts is better when participants rate their relevance in a survival
scenario (e.g., stranded in the grasslands of a foreign country) than when they rate them for
pleasantness or engage in other forms of deep processing (e.g., moving to a new house).
2. Survival information effect: In addition to survival processing effects, survival-related concepts
(e.g., injury, death, struggled, virus, battle) are also better remembered than more neutral concepts
(e.g., mountain, school, piano, tennis, quiet) or even similarly valenced (negative) and arousing
concepts (e.g., sad, bad, fat, cry, anger) (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, &
Garner , 2012).  That is, independent of whether these concepts are rated with respect to
pleasantness, being stranded in the grasslands, or moving to a new house, survival-linked concepts
are better remembered than negatively-valenced or neutral concepts.
Table 2.  Experiments on Survival Memory Advantages in Childhood
1. Otgaar and Smeets (2010) were the first to address the question concerning the emergence
of adaptive memory effects in childhood.  Here, 8- and 11-year-olds were asked to rate
concepts in a manner similar to that used with adults for their relevance to survival,
moving, or pleasantness.  Children evinced a similar survival recall advantage when rating
words for their utility in a survival scenario as opposed to rating those same words in a
moving scenario or for pleasantness.  Further, a recent study by Otgaar, Howe, Smeets,
and Garner (2012) even found that survival processing effects in children could be
generalized to different stimuli (i.e., words and pictures) as well as different memory
paradigms (i.e., intentional and incidental paradigms).
2.   Aslan and Bauml (2012) used a modified survival-processing paradigm to contrast
children’s incidental recognition memory performance given either an earlier survival-
processing task or an alternative, non-adaptive processing task.
Experiment 1: Three age groups were tested, 4- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and 9- to
10-year-olds.  The results showed the usual memory improvements with age, with older
children outperforming younger children.  More importantly, the findings indicated that
regardless of age, items rated for survival were better recognized than items rated for
pleasantness or word length.
Experiment 2: Using the same three age groups, children rated items either for their
relevance to survival or to two other scenarios that were designed to control for the use of
schematic and self-referential processing.  One of these scenarios had to do with staying
overnight at a friend’s house and the other, one that also controlled for valence, had to do
with being forgotten at school/kindergarten.  Like the first experiment, these results
showed that older children remembered more than younger children and that regardless of
age, children’s incidental recognition performance was superior for items rated for
survival.
Summary: Together, these experiments paint a consistent picture of children’s incidental
memory for items that have undergone survival-related processing.  Indeed, these results
would appear to provide ample support for the idea that the usual mnemonic advantages of
processing information for its survival value appear very early (4 to 6 years of age) in
children’s recollection repertoire and remains important throughout memory development
(9 to 10 years of age).  Thus, it may not be unreasonable to conclude that adaptive memory
is functional early in life and that our memory systems have been shaped by our ancestral
past to be particularly sensitive or “tuned” to remember fitness-relevant information, even
very early in childhood before we have had much experience with or knowledge of
survival-related situations.
Table 3.  Ultimate versus Proximate Explanations of Survival Processing
To properly understand behavior (e.g., survival processing advantage) in evolutionary
terms, one should obtain both ultimate and proximate explanations (Scott-Phillips, Dickens, &
West, 2011).  Importantly, such explanations are said not to stand in opposition to each other.
Rather, both levels of explanation can complement each other, providing a more complete
understanding of the evolution of certain trait or behavior.  Furthermore, in the present article, we
propose that the ultimate explanation of adaptive memory (see below) can only be relevant for the
scientific study in memory if one takes into account which proximate mechanisms mediate the
survival processing effect.
Ultimate Explanations
Ultimate explanations are involved in why a certain trait or behavior evolved and which fitness
consequences such a trait or behavior possesses. With respect to the survival processing
advantage, Nairne et al. (2007) were the first to address the ultimate functional value of memory
by asking why memory should show sensitivity to survival-relevant information.  So the ultimate
explanation concerning the evolutionary “necessity” of memory is that it is “prepared” to give
priority to fitness-relevant information.
Proximate Explanations
Proximate explanations refer to understanding how a certain trait or behavior evolved and which
mechanisms underpin that trait or behavior. In our article, we argue that the following proximate
mechanisms might underlie the survival processing advantage:  Elaboration (i.e., using related
information, imagination, inflation to execute a certain task), relational processing (i.e., encoding
of relationships among concepts or objects), item-specific processing (i.e., encoding of individual
details about specific concepts and objects), and self-reference (i.e., encoding information relevant
for the self).  So, the proximate explanation relies on processes that have emerged to accomplish
the evolutionary function of memory.
Table 4.  Related Adaptive Memory Processes and Paradigms
1. Processes: Experiments on Stress
Survival situations, such as being attacked by a vicious animal, are often accompanied by
an increase in stress hormones.  Therefore, it might seem that there is an obvious
connection between survival processing and the experience of stress.  Indeed, it might be
the case that stress is also a proximate variable underlying the adaptive memory
phenomenon.  A recent examination of stress and survival processing found that each of
these variables independently enhanced memory performance (Smeets, Otgaar,
Raynaekers, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2012).  It would seem that stress, at least as these
experimenters operationalized it, does not serve as a proximate mechanism for the
adaptive memory phenomenon.
2. Paradigms: Episodic Future Thought
One of memory’s adaptive functions is to help organisms navigate their future.  That is, to
plan for contingencies that may come about that could threaten survival.  Such planning
might include storage of food supplies, creating strategies for securing mates for
reproduction, or trying out hypothetical alternative courses of action to solve problems.
Interestingly, research on episodic future thought has found that many of the requirements
for engaging in this behavior (e.g., projecting one’s self into the future) are also available
to young children (see McCormack & Atance, 2011).
